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The reform of the CAP in 1999, with extensive revisions in 2003 (Council regulation 
1782/2003), was constructed around three central ideas:  decoupling,  cross-compliance of 
payments, and modulation. 
Decoupling, which is specifically analysed in this article, is intended to eliminate all 
aid  linked  in  one  way  or  another  to  production,  in  favour  of  aid  which  is  completely 
independent of the production activity. It is encapsulated in the new 2003 regulation by the 
introduction  of  the  right  to  a  single  farm  payment  (SFP)  proportional  to  farm  area, 
independent of production activities. 
These new arrangements have been accompanied by much variation in the application 
of the reform, and the member states have taken great advantage of the extensive room for 
manoeuvre inherent in the new regulation. This is revealed in the extreme diversity of choices 
made, both in the degree of decoupling (total or partial) and in the methods of calculating the 
SFPs (historical or regionalised references).  
In  order  to  better  understand  the  reasons  for  and  practical  details  of  the  differing 
national choices, this article presents a synthesis of the results of a comparative study of how 
the SFPs are managed in four large EU 15 countries (Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy), 
chosen because of the diversity in their approaches to decoupling and the calculation and 
trade of the SFPs. Objective economic data specific to each country and national political 
context are combined to e on the evolution of production systems and xplain the observations, 
taking into account both the implications of how agricultural holdings, production systems 
and land are categorised, and the expected effects structures.   
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This paper is based on a study carried out in 2006 for the French Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries
 1. It is a translation in English of an article published in july 2008 in the French 
review “Notes et Etudes Economiques”
2. Nevertheless, the comments and analysis presented 
here are the sole responsibility of the authors
3, and should not be taken as representing the 
views or positions of the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.  
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Since 1993 the pace of reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy has accelerated. 
Intended to last seven years, the reform of 1999 was thoroughly revised in 2003, to such an 
extent that what was originally intended as a mid-term revision became a full-blown reform, 
in the hope of clearly defining prospects for European farmers until 2013. 
One of the strong points of this new reform was the setting up of a system of single 
payments, the modalities of which vary enormously between countries. This new situation 
raises the question of how agriculture may evolve differently across Europe. It is particularly 
interesting for a heavily agricultural country such as France to understand what is happening 
in the other EU countries, especially those which used to make up the EU 15, and are subject 
to the same rules for the application of the reform.   
After discussing in the first section the issues raised by the reform concerning the 
management of direct aids to agriculture under the first pillar of the  CAP, in the second 
section  we  draw  up  an  inventory  of  the  diverse  modalities  used  to  organise  the  single 
payments in the EU 15 countries, in particular in Germany, Italy, Spain and Great Britain, 
which were the object of a study and deeper analysis.  
Using  this  inventory  as  our  starting  point,  we  will  attempt  a  first  analysis  of  the 
differing impacts of the new arrangements with two themes: how the aid is shared out (third 
section) and the impact on the production systems (fourth section). 
These initial observations will lead us to a last, concluding section in which we discuss 
the prospects for the CAP and reflect on the directions it may take. 
 
A new “Pick and Choose” Agricultural Policy: Understanding the Different National 
Choices 
Greater   variety 
The  adoption  of  this  latest  reform  was  complicated  because  a  certain  number  of 
member states, notably France, considered that there was no need to shake up the calendar 
fixed in 1999. It was finally made possible thanks to the budgetary agreement reached at the 
European summit of October 2002, which fixed the framework for financing the CAP with a 
budget for the first pillar funded until 2013. When the 2003 agreement runs out, this budget 
will be shared between the old and new member states in such a way that each EU 15 country 
will obtain, in exchange for consenting to the new reform, the guarantee of keeping until 2013 
the rights to Community support previously accorded them under the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Further, the negotiations led to this new reform containing multiple opportunities to 
                                                                                                                                                          
each country studied -  Mrs. Françoise Moreau-Lalanne, agriculture attaché in Germany, Mrs. Cécile Bigot, 
agriculture attaché in Spain, Caroline Cognault, assistant agriculture attaché/veterinary attaché in the United 
Kingdom, and Thibault Lemaitre, assistant agriculture attaché in Italy, for their availability and involvement in 
the carrying out of this study.  4 
 
 
‘pick and choose’ the modalities for applying the new common arrangements, which was a 
major factor in reaching consensus.     
A new step towards complete decoupling, and a new scheme: the SFP  
The 2003 reform was ambivalent. It was the latest step in the movement begun in 1992 
and continued in 1999 with the Berlin agreement, featuring a reduction in prices and the 
establishment  of  partially  decoupled  payments,  because  unconnected  to  the  volumes 
produced. It represents a further step towards decoupling, where part or all of the payments 
have  become  independent  of  the  production  activity.  As  in  the  previous  reforms,  it  was 
justified by the Commission and by the Council of Ministers by the need to respond to the 
concerns of European citizens regarding food safety, product quality and the protection of the 
environment, by the need to stabilise agricultural expenses during a pivotal period of EU 
enlargement to include 10 and soon after 12 or 13 new member states, and lastly by the need 
to consolidate the European position at the WTO, during the Doha negotiating round
4. 
These  multiple  objectives  are  linked  to  a  fundamental  economic  idea,  that  of 
decoupling, which aims to eliminate any aid connected in one way or another to production, 
which is considered to create imbalances in competition, in favour of aid which is completely 
independent of the production activity. In this sense, the 2003 reform represents an important 
turning point in the allocation of aid, in introducing several new principles. From 2007 at the 
latest,  the  payments  to  large  scale  farming,  cattle,  sheep  and  dairy  farming  (introduced 
between 2004 and 2006), as well as certain other payments will be totally or partly
5 replaced 
by a single payment per holding. The setting up of the new decoupled payment scheme is 
based on aid which is proportional to the farm area. The right to payment is therefore no 
longer linked to the activity, but to the possession of ‘eligible’ land. In the spirit of the reform, 
many uses of the land are acceptable, including simple upkeep involving no production. It is 
in this sense that the payment is definitively decoupled from the production, in as far as it is 
linked neither to the type of production nor even to the existence of agricultural production. 
But the creation of these new rights raises a new question, concerning their transfer, which 
has resulted in a series of arrangements governing the setting up and functioning of reserved 
rights and the creation and supervision of the trade in rights, with, once again, significant 
room  for  adaptation  between  countries.  Lastly,  the  reform  makes  the  allocation  of  aid 
(decoupled  or  otherwise)  subject  to  new,  imperative  conditions,  in  order  to  respect  19 
directives and regulations concerning the environment, the identification of animals, public 
health and food safety and animal health and well-being, as well as respecting the agricultural 
and environmental conditions laid down by each state.  
                                                 
4  This round is once again deadlocked, following the failure of the ministerial conference of July 2006, so it is 
difficult to assess the validity of this argument.   
5Amongst other national arrangements for adapting the reform which allowed consensus, member states may 
decide to maintain a partial coupling of payments for certain produce, according to modalities given in the 




National modalities for applying the reform: new issues 
These  different  innovations  are  all  liable  to  significantly  alter  the  behaviour  of 
agricultural  producers  and  land  owners,  with  potentially  major  macro-economic  effects, 
which  economists’  simulations  can  only  predict  very  approximately,  given  the  numerous 
assumptions required to build their models.  The many possible adaptations of the modalities 
of implementing the reforms across countries and regions make the effects of the reform even 
less certain, particularly because the socio-economic characteristics of farming activities vary 
widely from one country to another, and within each country, from one region to another. 
To better evaluate the expected impact of the reform and understand the way in which 
each country has dealt with it and plans to proceed, a comparative study of countries was 
carried out based on a bibliographical synthesis of available administrative documents and 
research documents, as well as direct surveys of the main public and private figures involved 
in the conception and application of the reform
6. This study, from which the present article 
has derived some key results, covers the four large EU 15 countries which made different 
choices to France in the management of the SFPs and the application of article 69 – Germany, 
the UK, Spain and Italy. Without wishing to minimise the contributions of countries such as 
Holland, Denmark or Belgium, it should be remembered that these four large countries, with 
France, are responsible for the greater part of European agricultural production, as well as of 
Community aid, as shown in the following table: 
 
Table 1 - Shares by country for production and direct CAP aid 
  EU 15  France  Spain  Germany  Italy  UK  Total 5 
Production 2004  100  21.6  14.6  14.7  15.3  8.2  74.4 
Direct CAP aid 2002  100  25.3  13.2  18.1  12.6  10.3  79.5 
Direct CAP aid 2007[*]  100  26.5  11.2  17.8  9.4  12.6  77.5 
Source : L’agriculture dans l’UE. Informations statistiques et économiques 2005. OPOCE 2006 
* The amounts used are those of the budgets given in annexe VIII of regulation CE 1782/2003. We have checked 
that these amounts are very close to the direct aid payments for 2002, increased by the new decoupled dairy 





                                                 
6  For further details of the study method, consult the summary referenced at the end of the article. 6 
 
 
The Implementation Of The Sfps
 7: Through The Maze Of National Choices  
Overview of the countries’ choices   
The member states have made great use of the room for adaptation in the Community 
arrangements authorised by the Council’s regulation 1782/2003, which is revealed by the 
great  diversity  of  choices,  as  much  with  regard  to  decoupling  as  to  the  modalities  for 
calculating the SFPs (historical references or regionalisation). 
As far as decoupling is concerned, the 2003 regulation maintains some payments 
coupled to specific produce. For the other produce, it allows part of the payments for crops 
linked to cultivated fields to be maintained, and likewise for a part of the livestock payments 
linked  to  animals  kept  according  to  different  possible  combinations  detailed  in  the 
regulations.    Only  the  UK,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg  apply  maximum  decoupling  to  the 
totality  of  produce.  Greece,  Italy  and  Germany  have  retained  coupled  payments  (total  or 
partial) on a few limited crops (tobacco, hops, olives and seeds). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Holland have all chosen to protect their cattle produce, while Spain, France and 
Portugal have opted to retain the maximum number of coupled payments authorised, for both 
animal and vegetable produce.    
With regard to the implementation of the SFPs, the 2003 regulation allows two 
different ways of calculating the rights - using individual historical references, for the farming 
areas that had allocations in the past, or by mutualisation over a region, in which case the 
regional aid is based on the total area used for crops and livestock. This regionalisation is in 
itself  a  complex  issue,  given  the  regions’  alternative  modalities  and  differing  ways  of 
calculating the rights authorised in the regulations. The UK is the only member state to have 
varied  the  implementation  of  the  reform  according  to  region,  by  opting  for  different 
calculation methods for the SFPs (either historical references or regionalised ones) in different 
regions.  All  the  other  countries,  including  the  very  decentralised  federal  ones  such  as 
Germany, have chosen a unified implementation across the nation. Five member states and 
two of the UK’s regions have opted for total (England, Denmark,  Finland, Germany  and 
Sweden) or partial (Northern Ireland and Luxembourg) regionalisation when calculating the 
SFPs,  with  diversified  regional  references  varying  from  the  administrative  region  in 
Germany’s case to England’s ad hoc zoning system based on the agricultural potential of the 
land. The others (Scotland, Wales and the remaining member states) have based their SFP 
calculations on historical references. 
 
                                                 
7  The study referenced at the end of the article also includes an analysis of the implementation of article 69 in 
Italy and Spain, which is not given here. Briefly, one can say that the effects of article 69 are limited because of 
the restricted possibilities for redistribution payments it allows; either the payments are very precisely targeted 
and only concern a small number of recipients, in very specific systems, or else, as in Italy, the allocation 
conditions for the payments of article 69 are hardly selective at all, leading to derisory levels of support per 





Six main configurations   
 Studying the degree of decoupling and the degree of regionalisation in the calculation 
of the SFPs (historical or regionalised references, mixed references or according to a ‘hybrid 
static’ model) allows one to identify six main modality configurations for the application of 
the reform, which are displayed on the two axes of Figure 1. 
This  method  of  representing  the  different  modalities  for  implementing  the  reform 
reveals  certain  constant  features.  The  implementation  of  regionalisation  is  generally 
combined, in those member states where it has been chosen, with the maximum possible (or 
almost) decoupling of payments. Conversely, the retention of significant coupled aid goes 
hand in hand with the choice of historical references. We therefore perceive two types of 
strategy:  that  of  regions  or  states  like  England  or  Germany,  which  have  taken  fullest 
advantage of the innovations introduced in the 2003 regulation, and that of states such as 
France, Spain or Portugal, which seem on the contrary to have chosen the minimal possible 
application of the regulation, in order to limit the reorientation of production (by maintaining 
coupled  aid  when  possible)  or  by  redistributing  payments  (historical  references).  These 
choices  can  in  part  be  explained  by  the  socio-economic  and  socio-structural  conditions 
particular to each country. For example, among the five large countries under study, those 
which have maintained the maximum possible coupling and historical references (France and 
Spain) are both net exporters of agricultural products, no doubt motivated by the concern to 
maintain  their  production  potential.  Conversely,  the  three  net  importers  of  agricultural 
products (Germany, the UK and Italy) have opted for total decoupling, which certainly allows 
them to justify the aid more easily to their public. But the great diversity in choice can also be 
explained by the socio-political contexts prevailing in the member states at the time of the 
reform,  and  by  the  differing  political  clout  in  each  country  of,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
professional agricultural organisations, and on the other, environmental interest groups
8. 
                                                 
8 The study referenced at the end of the paper, and in its annexe devoted to detailed studies by country, give a 
deep analysis of the socio-political conditions which explain the choices made in each of the countries under 
study.  8 
 
 
















Managing the transition: an important part of the choice  
The order in which the new SFPs were implemented was also an important choice for 
the member states; the Figure above only gives a static view of the diverse national choices, 
after their full application (and supposing therefore that all that was planned will be applied, 
with no modifications along the way). Indeed, Germany and England have chosen an eventual 
uniformity  for  their  SFPs  by  region,  but  with  a  gradual  change  (dynamic  hybridisation). 
During the transition period, which will last ten years in both countries, there will therefore be 
juxtaposed a double system of individualised payments calculated on a historical basis and 
shared  payments  calculated  regionally.  In  England,  the  changeover  is  being  made  by  a 
progressive regional mutualisation of the historical payments covering 10% per  year. The 
German  ‘combined-model’  is  much  more  complex,  since  it  first  defines  ‘crop’  SFPs  and 
‘meadow’ SFPs, where each of these SFPs is made up of a shared part at the Land level, and 
an individualised part drawn from the historical references. To these are added ‘fallow land’ 
SFPs calculated at the regional level, ‘fruit, vegetable and potato’ SFPs based on the ‘crop’ 
SFPs  with  a  quota  of  eligible  area,  and  landless  SFPs  for  certain  specific  categories  of 
holding. It will only be at the end of the transition, between 2009 and 2012, that the SFPs will 
converge to a uniform SFP at the regional level, across all entitled farming areas.  
It is therefore clear that the reform’s stated objective of simplifying the management 
of  the  payments  is  unlikely  to  be  achieved  soon,  apart  perhaps  from  in  Italy  where  the 
decoupling is total and combined with historical references, which should result in stabilised 
Regionalisation
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payments as from 2007, once the CMO ‘sugar’, ‘tobacco’, ‘milk’ and ‘olive oil’ reforms have 
been taken into account. 
 
Regionalisation : a multi-faceted concept  
‘Regionalisation’  as  defined  in  the  reform  is  explained  in  the  regulation  CE 
n°1782/2003 under Title III, Chapter 5 (Optional regional implementation, section 1). Article 
58  gives  member  states  the  possibility  of  implementing  the  single  payment  scheme  at  a 
regional level. The text allows the member states to define what they mean by a ‘region’, but 
this must be justified ‘according to objective criteria’. The notion of ‘region’ here is therefore 
independent  of  that  of  European  regions,  and  the  member  states  are  given  considerable 
leeway in choosing their own definition.      
In the regulation, regionalisation has two objectives. The first is to allow the national 
aid to be distributed among the chosen regions according to objective criteria defined by the 
member state (article 58). The second is to allow member states to harmonise the unitary 
value of the SFPs at the regional level (article 59). To achieve this, several arrangements are 
proposed:  
-  the distribution of the total regional aid over the totality of the hectares entitled to the aid,  
-  the distribution of a part of the total regional aid over the totality of the region’s hectares 
which are eligible to receive the aid extended to fruit (except permanent crops) and full 
fields of vegetables, the rest of the aid being divided up according to historical references,   
-  the possibility, for a farmer with historical references, to have concurrently regional rights 
calculated on the basis of part of the total regional aid plus historical rights calculated 
using the remaining regional aid,  
-  the possibility of differentiating the unit value of the regional rights for grazing land (or 
permanent grazing land) from the other eligible land (article 61), 
-  the possibility of setting the unitary value of the regional rights according to progressive 
modifications following pre-defined stages and according to objective criteria (article 63). 
 
The different forms of ‘regionalisation’ in the calculation of the SFPs   
After all is said and done, the regulation allows member states great leeway over both 
their very definition of regionalisation and the modalities and pace of regional harmonisation 
of the SFP unitary value. As a result the modalities of the implementation of the arrangement 
vary greatly across the countries which have chosen this option.   
Germany has chosen a harmonised application of the ‘combined-model’ over all its 
administrative regions (the Länder). The distribution of the national aid among the Länder 
involves  an  adjustment  because  of  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  federal  government  to 
introduce solidarity between the regions. The calculation method for the unitary value of the 
rights  uses  most  of  the  arrangements  allowed  under  the  regulation  (differentiation  of  the 10 
 
 
unitary value between meadows and crops, concurrent regional and historical rights, and the 
progressive harmonisation of the unitary value of SFP).  In the final analysis the German 
choice is a centralisation of the implementation of the agricultural policy, functioning at the 
regional level. Justified by the desire for adjustments between the Länder, this choice reveals 
a regionalisation concept based on territorial fairness, with a tendency towards equalising the 
SFPs to which each hectare provides rights.  
Conversely, the UK has left the choice opened by Chapter 5 of the regulation to its 
four regions, both regarding the nature of the decoupling and the method of calculating the 
SFP unitary value. Scotland and Wales have opted for rights based on historical records, 
whereas England has chosen a regionalisation of the single payment scheme, based on the 
fertility and productivity of the agricultural areas (drawing on the European less-favoured 
zones)  and  corresponding  to  no  existing  administrative  boundaries.    Northern  Ireland  has 
chosen a system which combines a regional flat rate with a part based on historical rights. 
Across  the  whole  UK,  two  strands  of  regionalisation  combine:  the  first  is  that  of  the 
decentralisation of the implementation decision-making process for the CAP reform to the 
regions, while the second is implemented in England, with the introduction of zoning which 
differentiates the level of support according to the agronomic potential of the land.  
The last possibility open to member states is to not implement these regionalisation 
arrangements. The SFP unitary value is then defined at the holding level according to its 
historical references. An economic interpretation of the concept of regionalisation leads one to 
conclude that it is in the countries which have made this choice (Spain, Italy and France) that 
regional differences in the level of direct support for agriculture are most pronounced. From 
the moment that the level of aid per hectare is positively correlated with productivity level, 
the implementation of the reform in Spain, Italy and France will tend to strongly support the 
agricultural areas with great agronomic and economic potential, to the detriment of the less 
productive areas and more challenged regions
9.  
In the final analysis, depending on the options chosen, regionalisation can mean:  
-  a uniform level of unitary aid for all farmers in the same administrative region; 
-  a uniform level of unitary  aid for all the farmers in the same  ‘natural’ region defined 
according to its agronomic potential (with specified zoning); 
-  unitary aid levels based on historical references which reflect more or less directly the 
regional and local levels of agricultural productivity.  
To conclude, the economic decisions of the member states regarding the reform appear 
consistent with the stakes involved for their agricultures. The objective of maintaining the 
agricultural production potential in Spain and France, but also in Italy, has led them to retain 
the historical references which in effect correspond to a desire for efficiency (strengthened in 
France and Spain by the retention of as many coupled payments as possible). In Germany, by 11 
 
 
putting  the  issue  of  justifying  agricultural  support  centre  stage,  the  objective  is  more 
obviously  to  share  out  the  aid.  England,  meanwhile,  has  attempted  to  reconcile  the  two 
approaches, by ‘playing’ with the boundaries used to calculate the regionalised payments. 
 
National reserve: two schemes for its use  
The modalities for transferring the SFPs between recipients play an important role in 
the distribution of the payments among the different categories of farmers. The regulations for 
the application of the reform authorise transfer modalities and national reserve management, 
which vary greatly across member states. 
All the member states have constituted a national reserve with the same short term 
objective of dealing with special cases, for the initialisation of the arrangement (the initial 
grant  of  the  SFPs).  The  longer  term  prospects  for  its  use  lead,  however,  to  operational 
modalities for the reserve which differ according to the country (see Table 2).  
With regard to the four cases studied here, two broad approaches to the use of the 
reserve  are  apparent  -  one  which  sees  the  reserve  as  a  temporary  device  to  smooth  the 
transition to the new system (in England and Germany), and the other as a permanent device 
for intervening in the SFP transfers.  
 
Table 2: Planned modalities for using the national reserve
10 in each country 
Country  France  Germany  England  Italy  Spain 
Initial deduction  3%  1%  4.2%  3%(1)  3% 
Deductions from transfers 
sale of SFP without land  
















Prospects  Maintain  Close
11   Close  Maintain  Maintain 
(1) Approximation based on global data including the reserve, article 69, additional deductions for increased 
area, etc. 
(2) During the first three years, then 30% 
(3) Except: transfer of an entire holding: 5%; transfer to have new facilities or inheritance: 0% 
 
In the first case, the temporary nature of the reserve is due to England and Germany’s 
liberal attitude towards the regulation of the market in SFPs. There is no further need for 
public control after the initial SFP payment to farmers. In these countries, no deductions from 
                                                                                                                                                          
9  The payments specifically intended for the less-favoured regions as planned in the framework of the second 
pillar can in part reduce this geographical disparity in support, without however completely compensating for it.  
10 These are the rates planned in June 2006. In France the initial deduction rate was in the end only 2.2%. 
11 In May 2006, 75% of the budget was used. As an illustration, in the German region of Hesse, 1.7 M€ of the 
national reserve were awarded to about 800 farm holdings, which is a little more than 3% of the holdings and on 
average  2,125€ of additional rights per recipient holding.  12 
 
 
transfers are planned and they are now wondering about the modalities for closing the reserve; 
in Germany’s case, the proposition is to share the remaining funds among all the SFPs
12. In 
Germany, the low level of the initial deduction is partly explained by the restricted criteria 
defining special and exceptional cases, and partly by the fact that the regionalisation of the 
great majority of the crop and cattle slaughter premiums, calculated using the 2005 database, 
removes most of the problems linked to the anteriority of the reference period 2000-2002. In 
the  English  system,  the  use  of  historical  references  from  2000-2002  and  a  fairly  broad 
interpretation  of  exceptional  situations,  have  led  to  numerous  requests  for  supplementary 
SFPs from the national reserve, which justifies the high initial deduction of 4.2%.  
The SFP operational modalities in Italy and Spain are similar to those in France. In 
these countries, in addition to the management of special cases for awarding the initial SFPs, 
the reserve has the implicit purpose of controlling the market in payment entitlements. This 
objective justifies the permanent deductions applied according to the regulation, though none 
of these member states has explicitly defined the criteria for awarding the SFPs beyond the 
initial  rights  allocation  stage.    This  situation  raises  the  question  of  what  arbitration  this 
arrangement will require in the transferring of SFPs, which will involve either paying for 
titles in an SFP market, or else receiving them freely through the reserve. 
 
The market in SFPs:  limited prospects 
Article 46 of regulation 1782/2003 allows for the possible setting up of a market in 
SFPs, but lays down the modalities of their transfer very precisely: 
- ‘Transfers of payment entitlement can only be made to a farmer in the same 
member  state,  apart  from  the  case  of  inheritance  or  brought  forward 
inheritance… 
- A member state may decide that the payment rights can only be transferred or 
used within the same region… 
- Transfers of payment rights, with or without land, can be made by sale or any 
other definitive transfer. However, the lease or any similar transaction is only 
allowed when the transfer of payment rights is accompanied by the transfer of 
an equivalent number of hectares eligible for aid… 
- In the case of the sale of payment rights, with or without land, the member states 
may decide that a part of payment rights sold should be paid into the national 
reserve, or that their unitary value should be  reduced to the benefit of the 
national reserve…’ 
In  those  countries  that  have  applied  regionalisation  (Germany  and  England),  the 
potential for a market in SFP exchanges is low because all their areas have SFPs at their 
                                                 
12 Negotiations with the Commission are under way on this matter, which European regulations do not provide 
for. Such an eventuality will also require a new look at the modalities for those SFPs unused for three years, 13 
 
 
disposal,  and  eventually,  the  SFPs  per  hectare  will  be  constant.  Moreover,  England  and 
Germany have decided to reduce the market in SFPs to within the same region, which limits 
the  transfer  possibilities.  Further,  particularly  in  Germany,  the  regional  area  devoted  to 
agricultural is reduced each year, to such an extent that there will soon be an excess of SFPs 
relative to the eligible areas.   
In the countries which did not choose regionalisation, the risks of speculative transfers 
are higher, but there is a will to limit the scale of these transfers by making large deductions 
on  transfers  without  land.  In  all  the  countries  studied,  the  total  amount  of  trade  in  SFP 
transfers was low, or even non-existent, at least at the time of our investigation, in May 2006. 
One of the major reasons for the lack of such a market is that definitive entitlements were 
only,  at  best,  awarded  at  the  end  of  2005,  and  in  May  2006  this  was  not  yet  finished. 
However, a market in SFPs can only be set up for definitive entitlements
13. 
In Italy, the transfer of entitlements has so far been very rare. The payment agency 
(the  AGEA)  counted  8,500  transactions  between  November  2005  and  February  2006, 
including by inheritance. As only definitive rights can be traded, the market began late in 
December 2005 after the definitive notification of the payment rights, and was once more 
suspended in 2006 while awaiting the new definitive rights for 2006. A rights exchange to 
facilitate  trades  is  planned.  In  addition,  the  market  in  rights  remains  restricted  and 
regionalised,  which  limits  the  risks  of  geographical  transfers,  particularly  that  of 
desertification  in  the  poor  southern  and  mountainous  regions.  Further,  in  certain  Italian 
regions, there are more rights available than eligible areas, because of the rigid land market, 
with very high prices; the access to eligible areas is another limiting factor.  
All these elements lead to the conclusion that the market in rights will never be very 
significant  in  Italy,  which  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  the  visible  indifference  of  the 
professionals working in this sector to the issue. Indeed, the face value of the rights is on 
average 300€ for large crop farming, compared to a land price of the order of 30,000€, a ratio 
of 1 to 100, which puts the issue of entitlements into perspective. The trade in SFPs will thus 
principally  occur  when  passing  on  holdings,  which  will  not  be  the  object  of  significant 
speculation. 
In Germany, it is likely that fruit, vegetables and potatoes for consumption will be the 
object of speculation in the trade of SFPs. This is because the regionalisation system has 
opened the right to payments for these produce, which did not use to be covered. According to 
the representatives at the Chamber of Agriculture in Lower Saxony, the trade in fruit and 
vegetable SFPs is running at about 700€ for an SFP which gives the right to a premium of 
455€. This relatively low trading value is probably due to the quota in fruit and vegetable 
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production, imposed under regulation 1782/2003, which strictly controls the allocations of 
production permits (76,347 hectares in Lower Saxony). 
There is no official exchange for SFPs, either at the federal level or at that of the 
Länder. Local grants can be set up according to needs. This was notably the case in Lower 
Saxony to trade unused SFPs before the submission of aid declarations in 2006, and to share 
the supplementary payment resulting from the implementation of the new sugar CMO among 
the existing SFP recipients. 
To date, no accurate assessment can be made in Germany concerning the amount of 
trade and the market price of the SFPs. So far mainly beetroot farms have been involved in 
SFP trading for the 2006 season, in a rather unusual context which does not allow a reliable 
estimate of their trade value.  
 In  Spain,  by  June  2006  there  was  still  no  organised  SFP  market.  There  are  few 
indicators  to  show  what  this  market  could  be,  but  there  is  a  large  surplus  in  eligible 
agricultural land without SFPs, which could generate a demand for rights. But these eligible 
areas without rights are generally situated in very poor regions, where the land has a poor 
yield,  which  limits  the  possibilities  for  upping  the  SFP  price.  It  is  therefore  too  early  to 
estimate the impact of the land situation in Spain on the SFP price.   
In England, the rights only began to be definitively established at the time of the first 
payments, i.e. in March 2006. A market in rights seems to have started up from June 2006, for 
rights which could only be activated in 2007. There are no exchanges as such, but the trade 
takes place through brokerage  agencies. Some brokers (and in particular those with  great 
experience in the brokerage of milk quotas) offer to sell rights. The price asked, when given, 
seems quite low
14. Some brokers advise charging roughly twice the 2005 premium as the 
trade value for rights, but this is only a guide, because one must also take into account how 
much of the rights are historical, and therefore destined to be reduced, and how much are 
fixed regional rights, which will be increased
15. 
Given these diverse observations, one can expect the market to be generally limited 
because of the important connection between the SFPs and the land, and in those countries 
having applied regionalisation, one can expect little potential for speculation on the market in 
SFPs without land, because of their homogenisation and their generalisation to all areas. It is 
possible that the market will become more active in the future because of the trade in fallow 
land  SFPs,  as  it  may  prove  economical  to  concentrate  them  on  the  least  productive 
agricultural land. In the countries which have retained historical references, the transfer of 
‘normal’ SFPs assigned to this less productive land for which the unitary value is relatively 
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low, towards land with high agricultural potential, could increase the trading value of these 
rights.  Nevertheless,  this  process  has  not  been  observed  during  the  investigations  in  the 
countries under study.  
 
A First Approach To The Efect Of The New Sfp Arrangement On The Reallocation Of 
Direct Aid 
Definitions and principles for the reallocation of aid 
The  principle  of  the  agricultural  policy  is  to  define  a  set  of  allocation  rules  for 
agricultural support, leading to a redistribution of the payments given to farmers, as a function 
of the economical orientation and size of the holdings, or the destinations for their products 
(food  or  otherwise).  The  modification  of  the  allocation  rules  could  potentially  involve  a 
modification in the way the aid is shared  among  farmers. The redistribution (or transfer) 
effect thus represents the amount (or share, when the amount is compared to the total aid 
paid) of aid having changed recipient between the situation before the reform, and that after 
the reform. This strictly arithmetical definition of the redistributive effect (the change in the 
distribution of aid) excludes here any value judgement about the fairness or justness of this 
reallocation. 
The 2OO3 CAP reform introduced three potential sources of aid transfer : 
-  The modification of the CMOs and the levels of support of products constitute the first 
source of transfers.  
Although the great majority of the supports for different produce have been carried over, the 
reform has introduced some modifications in the level of support for certain produce. It is the 
case for the hard wheat supplement in non-traditional zones, which disappeared from 2006. It 
was also the case for the direct dairy payments put in place progressively from 2004 to 2006, 
amounting to 35.5€/metric ton (in 2006), which were supposed to more or less compensate 
the drop in the price of milk (25% reduction in the intervention price for butter over 4 years 
and 15% for powdered milk over 3 years). Lastly, as from 2006, the reform of the sugar CMO 
has  introduced  some  new  decoupled  aid.  These  modifications,  which  correspond  to  the 
suppression or introduction of new supports, do not generate immediate transfers, in as far as 
they reduce or increase the total aid budget to be allocated, without affecting other payments. 
They do however modify the relative shares of the aid allocated to each sector. They can also 
indirectly open into new transfers, through the financial discipline mechanism, which allows 
for a reduction in the set of payments if the financing of new aid results in an overrun of the 
budget limit set for financing the first pillar of the CAP.  
-  The decoupling of aid  
The  decoupling  of  aid  can  constitute  a  second  source  of  transfers,  notably  because  of 
discrepancies between the reference and application periods of the new CAP. By referring the 
unitary value of the aid per hectare for each agricultural holding to the average aid level 16 
 
 
received between 2000 and 2002, the decoupling potentially results in aid transfers between 
producers.  Those  producers  who  modified  their  crop  rotation  in  order  to  achieve  more 
extensive production (particularly for pastureland) after the reference period, will find their 
aid level per hectare increase during the decoupling process, to the detriment of those who 
adopted  more  intensive  crop  rotations  during  the  same  period.  The  reallocation  is  then 
achieved indirectly through article 41 of the regulation, which stipulates a percentage of linear 
reduction  in  the  aid  when  the  total  demand  exceeds  the  national  budget  allotted  to  each 
member state.  Nevertheless, the redistribution effects of the decoupling remain limited in size 
and  smaller  yet  in  the  countries  which  have  limited  the  decoupling,  in  proportion  to  the 
coupled aid level.     
-  The calculation method for the decoupled aid  
The regionalisation of the calculation of the unitary value of the direct payments attached to 
the SFPs is without doubt the mechanism which introduces the greatest redistribution effects, 
in comparison to individual historical references. The levelling out of the SFP amount per 
hectare  for  farmers  from  the  same  zone  leads  to  transfers  resulting  from  two  main 
mechanisms:  (i)  the  structural  effect  –  in  a  given  sector,  regionalisation  generates 
redistribution effects from holdings which use the land intensively (with regard to the yield 
grown  or  raised  per  hectare)  to  more  extensive  ones,  and  (ii)  the  sectorial  effect  –  with 
regionalisation, the differentiation of initial levels of support according to the produce and the 
systems  of  production
16,  results  in  transfers  between  holdings  according  to  the  different 
production  types.  This  has  happened  in  Germany,  with  transfers  in  favour  of  extensive 
livestock  farming  systems,  and  to  an  even  greater  extent  in  fruit  and  vegetables,  which 
benefited from no aid before the reform but now obtain aid per hectare under regionalisation. 
This arrangement has led to a cap on the areas being given the right to this new aid (new 
quotas), in order to limit the unintended effects of these new transfers.  In practice, these 
different redistribution effects combine in complex interactions, making it difficult to isolate 
their influence. 
 
Variable redistribution effects according to the choice of implementation 
Simulations carried out in several European countries have been based  on varying 
scenarios with the aim of comparing the impact of a reform based on historical references 
with that resulting from the implementation of regionalisation. 
The redistribution effects introduced by the reform in the countries which kept the 
historical references are marginal, and even more so where the payments are only partially 
decoupled. The implementation choices made in France and Spain had the explicit objective 
of limiting the impact of the reform on the amount received by each holding. However, the 
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payments  are  not  set  in  stone:  the  progressive  application  of  the  modulation  of  aid  for 
holdings receiving over 5000€ and the probability in the medium term that financial discipline 
will be applied, mean there is a risk that payments will be reduced before 2013 (but these 
reductions  will  be  applied  in  the  same  way  in  the  countries  which  have  chosen 
regionalisation). In the countries which have applied regionalisation, the redistribution effects 
on the payments were an important factor taken into account when defining the practical 
application  of  article  59.  The  management  of  the  transition  period  was  the  second  major 
concern, in Germany as much as in England, in order to give the farmers the time to adapt 
their production systems to the new aid distribution rules. 
The  term  ‘hybrid  model’  which  is  commonly  used  to  refer  to  the  regionalisation 
implementation  modalities  actually  covers  several  different  approaches  to  regionalisation, 
regarding the control of the redistribution effects. The differences can be pinpointed using two 
main criteria: (i) the type of zone chosen for the application of regionalisation is the main 
factor influencing the redistribution effects at the end of the implementation of the reform (i.e. 
at the end of the transition period), and (ii) the modalities for managing the transition phase 
influence the pace at which the transfers will take place.      
 
Two contrasting cases: Germany and England 
In  both  these  respects,  the  regionalisation  model  selected  in  Germany  differs 
significantly from that applied in England.  
-  The type of region selected:  
In Germany, the regional area used is the Land. In administrative terms, it brings together a 
relatively  varied  range  of  produce  and  types  of  production  structure.  FAL  (Federal 
Agricultural Research Centre) simulations have found a variation in the amounts of SFPs 
across  the  Länder  going  from  260€  per  hectare  in  Saarland  to  370€  in  North  Rhine-
Westphalia, which is explained by the structural differences in agricultural holdings between 
the Länder. Within each Land, the redistribution effects between holdings are significant as 
much in terms of structural effects as in sectorial ones. 
England,  on  the  other  hand,  has  chosen  to  define  three  zones  according  to  their 
agricultural potential, which correspond to different types of agriculture: moor land in less 
favoured regions, which feature extensive cattle and sheep farming, the other less favoured 
zones featuring livestock and mixed farming, and zones not classified as less favoured with 
large scale crop farming and the most intensive livestock farming. This zoning approach, 
specifically  developed  for  the  implementation  of  the  reform,  more  clearly  keeps  the  old 
distribution of payments than in Germany.  In consequence, the lease favoured zones receive 
very little aid, whereas the zones not classified as less favoured enjoy eight times greater 
support per hectare, which allows the redistribution effect between regions (and indirectly 
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between holdings and production systems) of the ‘regionalisation’ in the calculation of direct 
payments to be severely limited.   
-  The management of the transition phase:  
The great majority of the member states or regions that are implementing regionalisation are 
doing it progressively,  and have accordingly developed  a hybrid model which allows the 
gradual transition towards a new system of aid distribution. In England, the transition system 
is  linear,  allowing  them  to  change  progressively  from  exclusively  historical  references  in 
2004 to completely regionalised payments by 2012. The transition system does not introduce 
further redistribution effects, but rather staggers their appearance over time.   
In the German case, the implementation of regionalisation fits into a strong tradition of 
redistribution. The first stage of redistribution occurs when the national aid budget is shared 
out among the Länder: 65% is proportional to the aid given in the previous year in each Land 
and 35% is given according to the respective eligible areas in each Land. 
The transition arrangement chosen in Germany stipulates, from 2005, two regionalised 
payments:  (i)  one  for  ‘large  scale  crop’  areas,  based  for  the  most  part  on  the  previous 
payments made for these crops (apart from the payments for sugar, tobacco and fodder which 
are still paid according to historical references), and (ii) one for meadows, made up of the 
slaughter  premium  for  large  cattle,  the  national  supplement  and  half  of  the  extension 
supplement. This premium, which is paid to all holdings featuring meadows, is supplemented 
by the other animal premiums (amongst which, the dairy premium) on the basis of individual 
historical references
17. 
The  regionalisation  of  the  ‘large  scale  crop’  payments  and  of  part  of  the  animal 
payments in 2005 generated some redistribution effects as from the first year of the reform’s 
application. In addition, the German transition system allows the Länder, if they so wish, to 
apply adjustment rules between the ‘large scale crop’ regional aid and the ‘meadow’ regional 
aid, by reducing the former to the benefit of the latter, which strengthens the redistribution 
effects in favour of the more extensive Länder which have implemented the arrangement. In 
Hesse, for example, the ‘meadows’ premium was thus increased by between 45 and 62€ per 
hectare. This first redistribution will remain in place until 2009, and in 2010 the regional and 
individual payments will be progressively harmonised to converge towards a sole premium 
per Land by 2013. It will therefore not be until the end of the process, from 2010, that the 
strongest redistribution effects will be felt. 
In summary, we note that the regionalisation application mode influences the scale of 
the  redistribution  effects.  According  to  the  results  of  a  study,  carried  out  for  the  English 
Ministry of Agriculture, 13% of total decoupled aid will be transferred from holdings in dairy 
and granivorous livestock, cereals and mixed production to extensive livestock farms in less 
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17  For  a  more  detailed  presentation  of  the  German  combined-model,  which  is  particularly  complicated  to 
implement, see fascicule 2 of the study given in the references.  19 
 
 
favoured zones. Quite logically, it is in the zones where alternative productions are the most 
straightforward (those not categorised as less favoured and to a lesser extent, less favoured 
zones apart from moor land) that the transfers are most intensive, while the more extensive 
livestock holdings are the only ones to be found in moor land, with very low support levels 
(barely more than 30€/hectare at the end of the reform). The German choices are explicitly 
part of a redistribution policy in favour of less intensive agriculture. Estimates produced by 
the FAL (Federal Agricultural Research Centre) put the share of transferred aid (apart from 
sugar) at over 20% by the end of the reform. From the economic point of view, the idea of 
promoting fairness by having the same support level for all eligible areas is debatable; it 
attaches equal importance to mountainous zones as to very fertile plains. Compared to the 
English situation, this egalitarian reasoning can be seen as a deliberate policy to help less 
favoured zones.   
 
A First Approach To The Effect Of The New Sfp Arrangement On Production Systems 
Several overlapping schemes  
The effects of the reform are difficult to assess in as much as they result from different 
schemes, which can work either in synergy or against one another:  
-  an  administrative  redistribution  scheme,  involving  the  reallocation  of  aid,  in  particular 
through regionalisation in those member states that have implemented it, and to a lesser 
extent by decoupling, but also by modulation and the financial discipline mechanism
18, 
-  An economic adjustment and production system reorientation scheme to respond to market 
signals,  which  depends  on  much  more  varied  parameters  internal  to  the  EU,  but  also 
external ones (particularly international trade negotiations), 
-  A patrimonial scheme involving the accumulation of land and investments, resulting from 
the previous schemes but which in the medium term contributes to its change in nature, by 
altering the share of public aid between the different types of holdings. 
The first effects, which were completely predictable, are quite easy to simulate. On the 
other hand, the economic and patrimonial effects are much more difficult to assess, because 
they  depend  on  numerous  parameters  which  are  external  to  the  CAP  (the  opening  up  to 
imports  for  example,  being  negotiated  at  the  WTO),  and  their  simulation  depends  on 
numerous  hypotheses  (elastic  supply  and  demand  in  relation  to  product  and  input  prices, 
substitution  of  productions  as  a  function  of  relative  prices,  comparative  yield  rates  for 
different locations, etc.).   
In spite of these difficulties, a certain number of simulations of the impacts of the 
reform on agriculture have been carried out in various member states, to give some pointers to 
certain likely developments. After only one year of implementation of the reform in three of 
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the four countries visited and the implementation still under way in Spain and in the sectors 
benefiting from the second wave of the reform (olive oil, tobacco, cotton and sugar) it was 
still too early, at the time of the investigation, to verify these predictions through observations 
on the ground of the first practical results brought about by the reform.  
Nevertheless we can anticipate the main probable impacts of the reform, by using 
available provisional simulations commented on by experts from the four countries under 
study.   
 
Expected impacts on vegetable production  
In the cereal-producing sector, it is probably hard wheat production that will feel the 
most  immediate  and  largest  effects  because  of  the  suppression  of  the  support  for  non-
traditional zones. In Italy, the reduction in production, sought by a number of economists and 
policy  makers  who  consider  that  some  of  the  hard  wheat  grown  is  of  poor  quality  and 
produced in inappropriate agronomic conditions, seems to be on a greater scale than that 
predicted by the models, notably because the cushioning effect expected from article 69 has 
not worked as intended. The statistical data from the payment agency (AGEA) estimates the 
drop in sown hard wheat between 2004 and 2006 at up to 45%
19, leading to the possibility that 
the land which is thus no longer used may be withdrawn from agricultural use.   
For  the  other  cereal  crops,  it  seems,  paradoxically,  that  it  is  in  Spain  that  the 
production  of  dry  cereals  is  likely  to  be  most  affected,  despite  the  partial  decoupling  of 
payments, because of the low yields. This reduction will be amplified in the zones where the 
traditional fallow system is already widely spread, as in Castilla la Mancha, and especially in 
Castilla  and  Leon
20.  Economists  consider  that  the  replacement  of  this  unpredictable  and 
barely profitable internal production by low cost imports will increase the competitiveness of 
the pork, poultry and cattle feeding sectors. However, policy makers are concerned about the 
impact of such developments on rural zones in the process of desertification. In England and 
Germany, the expected drops in cereal planting are still low (-4.2% in England according to 
an annual study of 13,500 holdings and –8% in Germany, according to modelling).  
As far as fruit and vegetables are concerned, the extension of CAP support to this 
hitherto ineligible sector in countries having chosen regionalisation, has been a real godsend 
for producers, who will now receive SFPs (300€ per hectare in Germany at the end of the 
reform). Even if this amount is relatively low compared to the turnover these produce can 
generate, first observations of the trading prices of these SFPs, at twice their face value in 
Germany in Denmark, reveal their value for the producers. This income reinforces (within the 
limits of the old areas) the boom in fruit and vegetable production in the southern German 
Länder such as Baden-Württemberg, where the competitiveness is already high thanks to the 
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cheap Polish labour force. In Denmark, where production costs are higher, it seems that these 
SFPs will make the fruit and vegetable production more competitive. Regionalisation can 
therefore introduce imbalances in competition in the fruit and vegetable sector, between the 
countries which implement it and the others.      
 
Expected impacts on animal production   
In the beef sector, most predictions indicate significant drops in production, largely 
due to the expectation of a drop in the price of meat and 8-day-old calves. In Germany, the 
most alarming predictions of the FAL (Federal Agricultural Research Centre) point to a 60% 
drop in the number of suckling cows by 2012, which is twice the expected figure under the 
hypothesis of the continuation of the old CAP (Luxembourg 1999). The difference would be -
15% for young cattle.  
Nevertheless, these predictions point to a smaller negative impact on meat production, 
in  as  far  as  the  reform  will  improve  the  productivity  of  holdings,  thus  mitigating  the 
expansion effects. Overall, if the current high meat price is maintained, future prospects are 
good, at least in the short term. The reduction in the dairy herd does seem to have begun 
however in England (-6.1% between December 2004 and December 2005 according to the 
annual study of holdings). In Spain, there are serious concerns about the livestock feeding 
centres. The drop in the number of suckling cows (and also dairy ones), already underway for 
several years, raises the possibility of supply problems in calves and grazing cattle. It is not 
sure that the implementation of article 69 will be sufficient to reverse the trend. In Italy, too, 
livestock  feeders  are  having  difficulties  finding  supplies  of  thin  young  animals,  and  the 
attempts to diversify the supply by looking to central and eastern European countries have not 
so far been conclusive, because of animal health problems in these new markets. In the short 
term, the Italian livestock feeders are tending to maintain their profitability by lengthening the 
feeding cycles.     
In the dairy sector, it is expected that in most of the countries affected by the reform, 
there  will  be  an  acceleration  in  the  restructuring,  which  could  be  accompanied  in  some 
countries by a regional concentration of production. This is particularly the case for Spain, 
where  the  milk  CMO  is  accompanied  by  an  implementation  of  article  69  which  should 
accelerate the restructuring through the disappearance of small centres, in favour of larger, 
more productive herds, with up to 500,000 kg of milk per holding. German predictions also 
point to increasing herd size, especially in the southern Länder, but to a halt in the growth in 
productivity.  In  this  context  of  adjustment,  Germany  has  called  for  the  removal  of  milk 
quotas. In England, the milk herd size dropped –4.9% between 2004 and 2005. 
In the sheep and goat-farming sector, small herds will be most affected in Spain, 
despite the recoupling of aid. The trend will be towards reduced production and the spread of 
large, extensive herds.  22 
 
 
Overall, however, the regionalisation of the unitary SFP calculation does not have a 
major  impact  on  the  evolution  of  production  systems.  The  comparison  of  the  different 
implementation scenarios for the reform in Germany (the calculation of the SFPs based on 
historical  references  as  opposed  to  regionalisation)  seems  to  point,  paradoxically,  to 
regionalisation  having  a  small  impact  on  production  evolution,  despite  the  extent  of  the 
resulting  transfers.  Most  of  the  impacts  identified  can  be  attributed  to  the  decoupling  of 
payments. The strong reduction forecast in the number of suckling cows, in a context where 
regionalisation,  in  Germany,  is  particularly  advantageous  for  meadows,  reinforces  these 
results,  and  reveals  the  imbalance  in  competition  linked  to  the  non-harmonisation  of  the 
decoupling of aid. The fact that some countries have maintained coupled payments for certain 
produce  while  some  have  not,  has  thus  modified  the  competition  between  the  different 
European regions, and led to a rearrangement of the distribution of production within the 
European space.    
 
Some Prospects To Conclude  
At the time of our investigations, during the first half of 2006, the policy makers and 
managers in charge of agriculture in the member states visited were preoccupied with the 
implementation of the reform, and so had little time to reflect on the future prospects of the 
CAP. Much important work remained to be done to inform farmers about the reform. In Italy, 
according to a survey of farmers, at the start of 2006 only 40% of producers had a good 
understanding of the reform, 20% had partial understanding and 30% knew nothing about it, 
whereas the great majority of farmers - particularly in livestock - were still unaware of the 
constraints inherent in cross-compliance. The majority of those interviewed did not expect 
any significant upheavals in 2009, but thought that major changes could occur in 2013.  
In Italy, most of the trade unions remain attached to the principle of regionalisation 
implemented  according  to  regional  criteria  and  agronomic  type  (the  differentiation  of 
mountainous  zones,  piedmont  plain  and  plains).  In  Spain,  the  decoupling  is  considered 
inevitable in the long term for the supported sectors, but the choices made in 2006 should 
allow the reform to be applied progressively in order to let the agricultural sector make the 
necessary adaptations gradually. Further, Spain is keeping a close eye on the two thirds of 
agricultural activities not covered by CAP aid and to the development of the common market 
organisations:  the  value  represented  by  the  opening  up  of  European  markets  to  low  cost 
supplies (particularly in animal feed, to strengthen the competitiveness of landless holdings) 
is counter-balanced by the risk posed to Spain’s Mediterranean produce by the opening up to 
international trade.   
In Germany, where the policy makers are convinced of the wisdom of applying the 
principles of the reform as fully as possible, the preoccupation has been with defending a 
minimum  level  of  support  for  agriculture,  justified  by  the  high  production  standards  that 
Europe needs to have recognised during the next round of WTO talks. It is not sure that this 23 
 
 
strategy will be supported by the UK, where the progressive transfer of credits from the first 
to the second pillar remains a priority.   
Two years after the implementation of the new reform, it would be dangerous to draw 
any definitive conclusions, especially given that the future of the CAP is still uncertain. The 
year 2013 looks like being a watershed, which should bring new, far-reaching modifications. 
Without  it  ever  being  explicitly  stated,  the  directions  mapped  out  by  the  Commission, 
involving a general movement towards the maximum decoupling possible, uniform premiums 
per hectare and the promotion of transfers to the second pillar, appear inevitable for the great 
majority of our foreign interviewees. In this respect, for many of the analysts we met, the 
German model seems to best anticipate coming developments.   
One of the key elements which can explain agricultural professionals’ desire for, or 
resignation  about,  this  evolution,  is  a  kind  of  shame,  regarding  how  best  to  justify  the 
agricultural aid to the other members of society, with a clear awareness that the production 
activity  can  no  longer  suffice.  Therefore,  faced  with  the  risk  of  significant  cuts  in  the 
Community’s agricultural budget, historical rights seem much more difficult to defend than a 
‘regional’ premium, with a fixed rate per hectare; likewise, payments under the first pillar 
appear much harder to justify than those under the second pillar. 
Looking beyond these tactics for justifying the payments, calling into question the 
productive function as a justification for agricultural activity, in favour of environmental or 
territorial aspects linked to the activity, actually involves calling into question a fundamental 
principle  of  the  CAP,  that  of  giving  preference  to  the  Community.  Why  should  Italy, 
Germany or the UK, showing a shortfall in agricultural and food produce, support French 
production, when Brazil, Argentina or New Zealand can supply them at a lower price? Even 
in  a  net  exporter  country  like  Spain,  many  economists  take  this  view,  as  Spain  exports 
produce  which  for  the  most  part  is  not  subsidised,  and  imports  produce  for  which  the 
historical subsidies justify much of the new payment rights.  
Nevertheless,  this  reasoning  has  its  limitations.  Most  of  those  interviewed,  and 
particularly  in  Germany,  are  well  aware  that  maintaining  direct  payments  is  essential  to 
maintaining the agricultural activity. Yet, if one takes the reasoning to its logical conclusion, 
with direct aid of about 330€ per hectare as in England or Germany simply for the upkeep of 
the land, this represents an exorbitant cost with no economic justification. Further, once the 
payments are decoupled from any productive activity, and are justified by the provision of 
specific amenities, one must immediately wonder about the readjustment of the SFPs between 
countries and regions: it is indeed difficult to claim that environmental or landscape amenities 
produced by farmers in East Anglia deserve higher payments than those produced by the 
farmers  of  Tuscany,  the  Peloponnese  or  Andalusia.  Today’s  certainties  pave  the  way  for 
tomorrow’s doubts. In today’s world riven by instability and conflicts, they may also pave the 
way for future food crises. But it is clear that the current preoccupations with very short term 
issues leave no room for this type of medium or long term reasoning.  24 
 
 
With regard to all these questions, which the reforms currently taking place cannot 
address, there is one possible answer, which is implied in the 2003 regulation and in practices 
observed on the ground: that of nationalisation, or even the regionalisation of the support 
policies for production activities. The common agricultural policy would evolve towards a 
Common Environment and Territorial Development Policy (second pillar), while economic 
and trade management policies for markets and risks would once again be the responsibility 
of states or regions.    
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